Artificial Intelligence, Artificial Flexibility, Artificial Patience

Balogh Zsuzsanna, Szalai Judit, Zvolenszky Zsófia (eds.): Artificial Intelligence. Hungarian Philosophical Review. 63 (2019) 4.

Résumé

In my paper I discuss the potential of AI and criticise the sceptical attitude of philosophers towards AI. Following the studies in a journal issue, I examine the frequently heard judgements: AI systems cannot be real subjects, cannot provide scientific discoveries, it makes no sense to attribute to them the autonomy necessary for morality, we must be careful not to assign them responsibility in traffic or politics. In essence, I am arguing the opposite. My basic idea is that we should not regard our own creations ‒ created for our own interests and purposes, in many ways surpassing us ‒ as alien, but as our best selves, as far as we can achieve it. As a way of doing this, I will present the Turing machine as a model of Descartes' conception of the mind, and then the machines that consistently execute rules as followers of Kant's moral laws, as ideals of duty-performance. In the meantime, I will try to answer the serious objections and concerns raised.