Deviant causal chains and intentional action

Auteurs

  • Krisztián Nyárfádi

DOI :

https://doi.org/10.14232/kulonbseg.2016.16.1.197

Résumé

There is a classical argument against the the so called "causal theory of action": the argument from deviant causal chains. This essay tries to show that this argument is not so strong as it first might seem to be, essentialy because the are promising answers to the argument. I reconstruct a strategy (exemplified by Searle and Mele) that can alleviate that concern stems from the deviant examples.

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Publiée

2016-01-31

Comment citer

Nyárfádi, K. (2016). Deviant causal chains and intentional action. KÜLÖNBSÉG (Difference), 16(1). https://doi.org/10.14232/kulonbseg.2016.16.1.197

Numéro

Rubrique

Cselekvés, autonómia, felelősség