The Third Moment of Truth

Abstract

In Moments of Truth (2018) János Tőzsér gave two arguments that the methods of philosophy are not suitable for solving philosophical problems: the first is based on the nature of philosophical problems, while the second is based on meta-inductive skepticism. First, I point out that Tőzsér’s notion of “philosophical problem” entails the thesis that there is no formal difference between philosophical problems and certain fundamental kind of scientific problems, and I argue that it does not follow from the nature of philosophical problems that we have no hope to solve them. Second, I argue that the same thesis entails that Tőzsér’s meta-inductive argument is faulty: it is either an example of survivorship bias, or it commits petitio principii. Since both arguments of Tőzsér fail, on their basis we have no reason to be skeptical about the potential for success of philosophical methods. Finally, we point out that Tőzsér’s new book, The Failure of Philosophical Knowledge (2023) also faces the same type of criticism as the arguments of his earlier book.