Suárez and the species intentionalis
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14232/kulonbseg.2020.20.1.259Keywords:
intentionality, species, cognition, mental objectAbstract
The aim of the paper is to analyse the account of intentional species in the essay Quidnam sint species intentionales with a view to Suárez’s oeuvre and set it into historical context. The four theses elaborated in the treatise are the following. /1/ The intentional species is an accident and belongs to the category of quality, but /2/ it does not belong to the same species as its object, moreover /3/ it is mental and indivisible in the intellect, whereas in other cognitive capacities it is material and divisible, and, finally, /4/ it has a formal similitude to its object. The theses are discussed with an emphasis on their interrelation and forming a coherent theory.